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Abstract
Using a standard open economy DSGEmodel, it is shown that the timing of asset trade
relative to policy decisions has a potentially important impact on the welfare evaluation
of monetary policy at the individual country level. If asset trade in the initial period takes
place before the announcement of policy, a national policymaker can choose a policy rule
which reduces the work eﬀort of households in the policymaker’s country in the knowledge
that consumption is fully insured by optimally chosen international portfolio positions.
But if asset trade takes place after the policy announcement, this insurance is absent
and households in the policymaker’s country bear the full consumption consequences of
the chosen policy rule. The welfare incentives faced by national policymakers are very
diﬀerent between the two cases. Numerical examples confirm that asset market timing
has a significant impact on the optimal policy rule.
Keywords: Asset trade; optimal monetary policy; monetary policy in open economies;
international financial markets.
JEL: E52, F41
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1 Introduction
In the literature on optimal monetary policy in open economies it is common practice to
model international asset markets in the form of trade in a complete set of Arrow-Debreu
securities.1 This makes it possible to side-step explicit analysis of portfolio allocation
problems. But new solution techniques (Devereux and Sutherland (2011) and Tille and
van Wincoop (2010)) now make it possible to conduct a much more explicit analysis of
asset market structure and its implications for optimal policy. These techniques can be
used to consider explicitly the way in which asset markets aﬀect the transmission mech-
anism between monetary policy and welfare. In this paper, we use these new techniques
to examine in detail the role of the timing of asset trade relative to the timing of policy
decisions in determining the way monetary policy aﬀects welfare in an open economy.
We show that the incentives faced by a policymaker can be very diﬀerent depending
on whether asset trade takes place before or after monetary policy is determined. If asset
trade takes place before policy is determined, equilibrium international portfolio positions
provide a high degree of insurance against the eﬀects of policy. This insurance is not
present if asset trade takes place after policy is determined. In eﬀect, if asset trade takes
place before policy is determined, the insurance provided by asset portfolios creates an
international spillover eﬀect which implies that some of the negative welfare impact of
policy in one country falls on foreign households. The insurance against the eﬀect of
policy, and thus the spillover eﬀect, is absent when asset trade takes place after policy is
determined. We show that the presence or absence of this insurance, and thus the presence
or absence of the spillover eﬀect, has a significant impact on the welfare maximising choice
of monetary policy by national policymakers.2
One way to illustrate how asset market timing impinges on equilibrium in an open
economy model is to note that in much of the existing literature it is typically stated
that complete international risk sharing implies a relationship of the form UC∗/UC = kQ,
where UC and UC∗ are home and foreign marginal utilities of consumption, Q is the real
exchange rate and k is a constant which is implicitly determined by equilibrium in asset
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markets. The asset-trade-before-policy case, which is the typical assumption in much of
the existing literature, is consistent with an assumption that k is exogenous and unrelated
to policy choices. On the other hand, the asset-trade-after-policy case implies that k is
endogenous and depends on policy choices.
The general principles of these arguments are straightforward to describe and under-
stand. The details of how these mechanisms operate within a fully specified dynamic
stochastic general equilibrium model with international trade in multiple assets are, how-
ever, much less obvious. For instance, in a dynamic model where asset trade takes place
period-by-period it appears that asset trade must inevitably take place after a policy
change has been announced. Does this imply that asset markets do not provide insurance
against policy changes?
This paper provides a systematic analysis of the links between policy decisions, con-
sumption and welfare and shows explicitly how the timing of asset trade aﬀects the incen-
tives of the policymaker. We show that policy decisions aﬀect consumption (and therefore
welfare) via two asset market transmission channels. One is a flow eﬀect which arises in
periods subsequent to the policy change, while the other is a one-oﬀ capital gain eﬀect
which potentially arises in the period in which a policy change is announced.
The flow income eﬀect is generated by a diﬀerence between home and foreign income.
If, for instance, the home monetary authority follows a policy rule which tends to depress
the expected level of home output, the flow income eﬀect will, other things being equal,
imply a reduction in home consumption. The capital gain eﬀect, on the other hand,
is the potential change in the value of the home country portfolio which occurs at the
time monetary policy is announced (i.e. in the initial period). A fall in expected home
income causes a fall in the value of home equity, which leads to a one-oﬀ capital gain
for the home population in the initial period (because home households optimally hold a
negative external position in home equity).
It is shown that the timing of asset trade in the initial period is critical in determining
whether the capital gain eﬀect is present or not. If asset trade in the initial period takes
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place before policy is determined then the capital gain eﬀect is present. But if asset trade
in the initial period takes place after policy is determined, the capital gain eﬀect is absent.
It is shown below that the presence or absence of this capital gain eﬀect has an important
impact on the incentives faced by the monetary policymaker.3
While there is now an extensive literature examining optimal monetary policy in open
economy models, there has been no previous detailed analysis of the implications of asset-
trade timing for the welfare eﬀects of policy in a dynamic multi-period setting. Indeed in
much of the current literature (see e.g. Gali and Monacelli (2005), Benigno and Benigno
(2006), Pappa (2004) and Faia and Monacelli (2008)) there is an implicit assumption
that policy decisions are made after asset trade takes place in the initial period. There is
rarely any justification for this assumption nor is there any recognition that it can have
important implications for the welfare eﬀects of monetary policy.
Senay and Sutherland (2007) do provide a basic analysis of asset market timing in a
very simple static single-period model and merely state and demonstrate the general prin-
ciple that asset market timing can aﬀect optimal policy choices.4 Senay and Sutherland
(2007) argued (but did not show explicitly) that monetary policy is likely to focus more
on stabilisation of output and income when asset trade takes place after policy. This is be-
cause in the asset-trade-after-policy case the monetary authority anticipates that financial
markets impose a welfare cost on a country when the monetary policy allows high output
volatility. The current paper explicitly demonstrates this result, but goes much further
by analysing asset market timing in a dynamic multiperiod framework. Arguably, asset
market trade, and all matters related to the sequencing of events, can only adequately be
addressed in such a setting.
In addition, the single-period model used in Senay and Sutherland (2007) lacks the
complex dynamics that are integral to the standard workhorse models used in the inter-
national macro literature. As we show below, the extension of the basic single-period
result to a dynamic setting is far from straightforward and one of the contributions of the
current paper is therefore to show exactly how the timing of asset trade and the welfare
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eﬀects of policy interact in a multi-period model of the type which is standard in the
international macro literature.
In dynamic multi-period models with Arrow-Debreu asset trade, one can think about
asset trade, and policy being set, in the initial time period. In such a framework, one way
to approach the dynamic analogue of the Senay and Sutherland (2007) analysis would be
to consider the timing of trade in Arrow-Debreu securities relative to the timing of policy
within that initial period. However, in a more realistic dynamic setting, trade in realistic
assets (such as bonds and equities) takes place period by period, rather than exclusively
in the initial period. In this more realistic setting, it seems that asset trade will inevitably
be taking place after policy decisions have been made.
This paper focuses on this more realistic setting and analyses the welfare eﬀects of
policy in a model with period-by-period trade in equity shares. Our analysis shows clearly
that the question of the timing of asset trade relative to policy arises even when asset trade
takes place period by period. The timing issue relates to the selection of an initial portfolio
of asset holdings. It is this initial portfolio which determines the capital gain eﬀect in
the initial period. The fact that asset trade also takes place in all periods subsequent
to the policy decision does not undermine the importance of the timing of asset trade in
the initial period.5 This fact only becomes apparent in the dynamic framework analysed
in this paper and this represents a further important contribution of the current paper
relative to the static analysis in Senay and Sutherland (2007).
The current paper also goes further than Senay and Sutherland (2007) by explicitly
modelling the equilibrium determination of asset market expectations of monetary policy.
We show that in the asset-trade-before-policy case the anticipation of the policymaker’s
optimal policy decision aﬀects asset prices in such a way that a welfare cost is imposed
on households. This aspect of the asset-trade-before-policy case has not previously been
analysed, so this represents a further contribution of the current paper relative to Senay
and Sutherland (2007).
Before describing our analysis in detail, it is important to emphasise that we are
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not arguing that the modelling of asset market timing (relative to policy decisions) in
itself represents a way to analyse market imperfections in international financial markets.
What we are showing is that asset market timing has important logical implications for
the interaction between financial markets and policy which have not been addressed in the
existing literature. This issue arises in both complete markets and incomplete markets
settings and can co-exist with many forms of asset market imperfection.
The analysis presented below is based on a simple two-country new-Keynesian model.
Policy is represented in terms of a choice of a feedback parameter in a monetary policy
targeting rule. This choice is made in the initial period. This simple framework provides
clear analytical solutions and thus helps to establish the main underlying principles. The
issues highlighted here are, however, applicable to a wide range of open economy macro
models.6
The paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 presents the model structure; Section 3
discusses the general approach to solving the model; Section 4 analyses the impact of
the timing of asset trade on the determination of consumption; Section 5 demonstrates
the implications for the welfare eﬀects of policy and describes the determination of prior
beliefs about monetary policy in the asset-trade-before-policy case. Section 6 concludes
the paper.
2 Model structure
The model is a standard open economy DSGE model of the type which has been widely
used to analyse monetary policy in open economies (see for instance, Gali and Monacelli
(2005) and Benigno and Benigno (2006)). The details of the specific model presented
below are chosen for illustrative purposes only. The results emphasised in this paper,
however, apply to a wide range of models.
The model consists of two countries, home and foreign, inhabited by a continuum of
infinitely lived individual households which are both consumers and producers. House-
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holds consume a basket of diﬀerentiated, perishable goods of total measure unity. Home
country households produce fraction n of goods while foreign households produce the re-
maining n∗ = 1 − n. Each individual household uses labour eﬀort to produce a single
good and is the monopoly supplier of that good. Nominal price inertia is modelled in the
form of Calvo (1983) price setting.
Asset trade takes the form of trade in equity claims on home and foreign income.
There is assumed to be only one source of random disturbances in the model, so trade in
two equity claims allows full sharing of consumption risk arising from this single source
of shocks.
We focus on monetary policy and welfare from the point of view of home country
households. The foreign country’s monetary stance is taken as given. The structure of
the foreign economy is otherwise identical to the home country, so the model descrip-
tion focuses on the home country equations. Where foreign variables do arise, they are
indicated with an asterisk.
2.1 Households and the goods market
Representative household h in the home country has a utility function of the form:
Ut (h) = Et
" ∞X
s=t
βs−t
µ
C1−ρs (h)
1− ρ −
K
μ
yμs (h)
¶#
(1)
where C is a consumption index defined across all home and foreign goods, y (h) is the
output of good h and Et is the expectations operator conditional on time-t information.
K, ρ and μ are positive constants and 0 < β < 1.
The consumption index C for home agents is given by:
C =
"µ
1
2
¶ 1
θ
C
θ−1
θ
H +
µ
1
2
¶ 1
θ
C
θ−1
θ
F
# θ
θ−1
(2)
where θ > 0 and CH and CF are indices of individual home and foreign produced goods
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with an elasticity of substitution between individual goods φ, where φ > 1. The parameter
θ is the elasticity of substitution between home and foreign goods. Home and foreign
goods are assumed to have equal weight in the consumption basket. Combined with an
assumption of producer currency pricing, this ensures that purchasing power parity holds
in all states of the world. The aggregate consumer price index for home agents is:
P =
∙
1
2
P 1−θH +
1
2
P 1−θF
¸ 1
1−θ
(3)
where PH and PF are the aggregate price indices for home and foreign goods.
Goods prices are assumed to be set in the currency of the producer and are subject
to Calvo (1983) price contracts. The probability that a given producer changes its price
in any particular period is taken to be a constant, (1− γ). The first-order condition for
the choice of prices implies the following
Et
( ∞X
s=t
(βγ)s−t
∙
(φ− 1) pH,tyt,s
CρsPs
−AsφKyμt,s
¸)
= 0 (4)
where yt,s is the period-s output of a home producer whose price was last set in period t.
Prices are assumed to be subject to “cost-push” disturbances, A, where
logAt = ζ logAt−1 + εA,t (5)
where εA is symmetrically distributed over the interval [−ε, ε] with E[εA] = 0 and
V ar[εA] = σ2A. Cost push disturbances are assumed to aﬀect only home country pric-
ing and are the only source of shocks in the model. Foreign producers are not subject to
cost push disturbances.
2.2 Asset markets
International financial trade takes the form of trade in equity claims on the value of home
and foreign aggregate output. Thus the home equity is a claim on Yt = ytPH,t/Pt, while
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the foreign equity is a claim on Y ∗t = y∗tP ∗F,t/P ∗t , where yt and y∗t are aggregate outputs
of home and foreign goods. Equity trade takes place period by period. At the end of
period t, home and foreign households allocate their net asset position across portfolios
of the two equity assets. In period t + 1, shocks are realised and output, goods prices,
equity prices and equity pay-oﬀs are determined. At the end of period t+ 1 equity trade
is repeated and portfolios are reallocated and held into period t + 2, and so on for each
future period.
The real pay-oﬀ to a unit of the home equity purchased in period t is defined to be
Yt+1 + Zt+1, where Zt+1 is the real price of home equity in period t + 1. Thus the gross
real rate of return on the home equity is r1,t+1 = (Yt+1 + Zt+1)/Zt, and the gross real
return on foreign equity is r2,t+1 = (Y ∗t+1 + Z∗t+1)/Z∗t . The aggregate budget constraint of
the home country can then be defined as follows
α1,t + α2,t = α1,t−1r1t + α2,t−1r2t + Yt − Ct (6)
where α1,t−1 and α2,t−1 represent the real external holdings of home and foreign equity,
brought into period t from the end of period t− 1.7
It is useful to define Wt = α1,t + α2,t to be the total net claims of home agents on
the foreign country at the end of period t (i.e. the net foreign assets, or NFA, of home
agents). The budget constraint can then be re-written as
Wt = r2,tWt−1 + Yt − Ct + α1,t−1rx,t (7)
where
rx,t = r1,t − r2,t (8)
Here the foreign equity is used as a numeraire and rx,t measures the "excess return" on
the home equity. Because α1,t and α2,t measure the external position of the home country
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in home and foreign equity, market clearing in asset markets implies
nα1,t + n∗α∗1,t = 0, nα2,t + n
∗α∗2,t = 0
To simplify notation, in what follows we will drop the subscript from α1,t and simply refer
to αt. It should be understood, therefore, that αt = α1,t = −n
∗
n α
∗
1,t, α2,t = Wt − αt and
α∗2,t =W ∗t +
n
n∗αt.
Preferences and the structure of asset markets imply that optimal consumption choices
satisfy the following Euler equation
C−ρt = βEtC
−ρ
t+1r2,t+1 (9)
while optimal portfolio choices imply
EtC
−ρ
t+1rx,t+1 = 0 (10)
2.3 Monetary policy and asset trade in period 0
Monetary policy is modelled in the form of a targeting rule. The monetary authority in
the home country is assumed to choose the monetary instrument (which is not modelled
explicitly) in order to ensure that the following targeting relationship holds
log
PH,t
PH,t−1
+ δ logAt = 0 (11)
Thus the monetary authority follows a state-contingent inflation targeting policy where
δ measures the degree to which producer-price inflation is allowed to vary in response to
cost push shocks. The analysis below focuses on the welfare implications of the choice of
δ. For the purposes of explaining and illustrating the main points of this paper, the precise
functional form of the policy rule is not a central issue. The key comparison which we
analyse below is the diﬀerence in the optimal choice of δ between the asset-trade-before-
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policy case and the asset-trade-after-policy case.8
The foreign monetary authority is assumed to follow a similar targeting rule. In
the foreign case, however, δ is assumed to be zero (i.e. the foreign monetary authority
completely stabilises the foreign PPI inflation rate). The foreign rule is taken as exogenous
and fixed and our analysis is focused on the policy problem of the home country.
In the initial period (i.e. period 0), it is assumed that the only events that occur are:
¥ A once-and-for-all decision by the home policymaker about δ, which is immediately
announced publicly.
¥ International trade in equities to establish portfolio allocations to be carried into
period 1.
The aim of the paper is to investigate the implication of the timing of asset trade
in period 0 relative to the timing of the policymaker’s decision about δ. There are two
alternative assumptions: (1) asset trade before policy; or (2) asset trade after policy.
We assume that households enter period 0 with zero net foreign assets and zero gross
asset positions. Asset trade allows households to establish optimal gross portfolio positions
which hedge against future shocks to A.
The crucial diﬀerence between the asset-trade-before-policy case and the asset-trade-
after-policy case is that households’ knowledge of δ at the time of asset trade diﬀers
between the two cases. This is illustrated in the time-lines shown in Figures 1 and 2.
INSERT FIGURES 1 AND 2 ABOUT HERE
Figure 1 shows that, in the case where asset trade in period 0 takes place before the
policymaker determines δ, households will trade assets in period 0 at prices which are
determined before the true value of δ is known. Asset prices at the time of asset trade in
period 0 will therefore incorporate household expectations of δ, i.e. asset prices will be
determined by their prior beliefs about δ, which we denote δT .
Figure 2 shows that, in the case where asset trade in period 0 takes place after the
policymaker determines δ, households will trade assets in period 0 at prices which are
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determined after δ is chosen. These asset prices will therefore incorporate full information
on the true value of δ.
In the case of asset trade before policy it is obviously necessary to specify how ex-
pectations of δ are formed. We will assume that agents in asset markets anticipate that
δ is chosen by the home monetary authority to maximise home aggregate utility. The
details of the determination of δT will be confirmed in Section 5 below, but at this stage
the equilibrium choice of δT can usefully be illustrated via Figure 3. In this figure the
value of δT is measured on the horizontal axis and the monetary authority’s choice of
δ is measured on the vertical axis. For each possible choice of δT it is possible to plot
the monetary authority’s “best response” in terms of the welfare maximising choice of δ.
An example of this “best response function” is illustrated in the figure. It will be shown
below that the welfare maximising choice of δ is in fact independent of δT , so the best
response function is horizontal. The rational expectations equilibrium is where the best
response function crosses the 450 line, i.e. where the actual value of δ equals the expected
value of δ. This is labelled B in the figure.
INSERT FIGURE 3 ABOUT HERE
Notice that, at the point of equilibrium, it is true by definition that the announcement
of the actual value of δ does not create a surprise for asset markets. But also notice that
to understand the incentives which support this equilibrium it is necessary to consider
what happens to asset prices in out-of-equilibrium situations. Consider for instance a
case where asset markets expect δ to be δO, but where the monetary authority chooses
a value of δ greater than δO. Because asset trade in period 0 is based on asset prices
which incorporate expectations δO, and asset prices at the start of period 1 incorporate
information on the true value of δ, there will be a capital gain (or loss) induced by the
announcement of monetary policy. This capital gain aﬀects the NFA position of home
households at the start of period 1 and thus aﬀects consumption plans and welfare from
period 1 onwards. A choice of δ less than δO would likewise generate a capital gain or
loss which would have an impact on consumption plans and welfare. Thus, in general, the
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first-order condition for the welfare maximising choice of δ depends on the derivative of
the capital gain with respect to δ. Hence the incentives faced by the monetary authority
when choosing δ are altered by the potential capital gain even though the capital gain
itself is zero in equilibrium.
This can be contrasted with the asset trade after policy case. In this case none of
the above capital gain eﬀects arise because, when asset trade in period 0 takes place
after δ is determined, asset prices always incorporate full information on δ. There is thus
no potential capital gain or loss generated by the announcement of policy. The absence
of the capital gain term implies that policy will have a diﬀerent eﬀect on consumption
and welfare compared to the asset-trade-before-policy case. The incentives faced by the
monetary authority and the resulting optimal choice of δ will therefore also diﬀer compared
to the asset-trade-before-policy case.9
One way to interpret events in period 0 is in terms of a Stackelberg leader-follower
game. In the asset-trade-before-policy case the asset market acts as the Stackelberg
leader and the policymaker is the follower. In the asset-trade-after-policy case the roles
are reversed, the policymaker is the leader and the asset market is the follower. In each
case the follower is able to make optimal decisions in the light of the decisions made by
the leader.10
3 Model solution
The aim of this paper is to investigate the implications of the timing of asset trade for
the evaluation of home welfare in period 0, i.e. welfare at the time that the policymaker
makes a decision about the policy parameter, δ. The main focus of analysis is therefore
on the eﬀects of the timing of asset trade on the incentives faced by the home-country
policymaker. The analysis presented below proceeds first (in this section) by showing
how expected portfolio returns aﬀect the welfare of home agents. In Section 4 we then
show how the timing of asset trade aﬀects the link between policy decisions and expected
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portfolio returns. Section 5 then shows how the timing of asset trade aﬀects the welfare
incentives faced by the home policymaker. It turns out that these incentives are unrelated
to the prior beliefs of agents regarding the policy parameter, δ. The analysis presented
in Sections 3 and 4 can proceed on the assumption that these prior beliefs are fixed and
exogenous. However, as already indicated above, the analysis of the full equilibrium of
the model in the asset-trade-before-policy case requires the solution for these prior beliefs.
In Section 5 we complete the analysis by deriving the solution for the full equilibrium
(including the endogenous determination of prior beliefs regarding δ).
In models of the form outlined above, welfare analysis is typically based on a second-
order approximate solution for aggregate utility. Aggregate (per capita) home welfare in
period 0 is given by
Ω =
1
n
E0
∞X
s=0
βs
½Z n
0
µ
C1−ρs (h)
1− ρ −
K
μ
yμs (h)
¶
dh
¾
(12)
A second-order approximation of Ω can be written as follows
Ωˆ = (1− β)E0
∞X
s=0
βs
½
Cˆs +
1
2
(1− ρ)Cˆ2s
−φ− 1
φ
∙
yˆs +
1
2
μyˆ2s +
1
2
φγ (1− φ+ φμ)
(1− γ)(1− βγ)π
2
s
¸¾
+O
¡
ε3
¢
(13)
where O (ε3) contains terms of order higher than two in the variables of the model,11 and
πs = PˆH,s − PˆH,s−1.
Equation (13) shows that home welfare depends on the first and second moments of
consumption, output and the rate of producer price inflation (as measured by π). In the
literature on optimal monetary policy there has been much discussion and analysis of
the properties of welfare functions of this form. This analysis is now very standard and
need not be repeated here. For the purposes of the current paper the main point that
should be noted is that home welfare depends positively on the first moment of home
consumption and negatively on the first moment of home output, i.e. positively on E0[Cˆs]
16
and negatively on E0[yˆs] for s = 1.. ..∞.
In general, the policy parameter, δ, aﬀects the way the monetary instrument responds
to shocks and therefore aﬀects the second moments of the endogenous variables of the
model. In turn, second moments aﬀect first moments of variables at the level of a second-
order approximation. So, for instance, δ aﬀects the risk premium on home equity (i.e. the
expected return diﬀerential between home and foreign equity) and also, via the impact of
risk on labour supply, δ aﬀects the expected level of output.12 The precise nature of the
links between δ and these variables is not the central issue in our analysis. It is suﬃcient
to note that the policy parameter aﬀects the expected level of output. The main question
of concern in our analysis is how the timing of asset trade aﬀects the link between the
expected level of output and the expected level of consumption.
Equation (13) shows that a reduction in the expected level of home output directly
increases home welfare (because it represents a reduction in work eﬀort for home house-
holds). The overall welfare impact of a fall in home output, however, depends on how
home consumption is aﬀected by the consequent fall in home income. Asset markets im-
pinge on the linkage between income and consumption via the impact of asset trade on the
cross-country sharing of consumption risk. The first step in our analysis of asset market
timing is therefore to derive a second-order approximation of the relationship between in-
come, portfolio returns and consumption. This is based on a second-order approximation
of aggregate budget constraints.
A second-order approximation for the aggregate home budget constraint is given by
Wˆt =
1
β
Wˆt−1 + Yˆt − Cˆt + α˜rˆx,t + λB,t +O
¡
ε3
¢
(14)
where for convenience the second-order terms have been gathered together in the term
λB,t which is defined in the Appendix. In general, a bar over a variable indicates its
value in the non-stochastic steady state and a hat indicates the log-deviation from the
non-stochastic steady state, except for Wˆt = (Wt−W¯ )/C¯, α˜ = α¯/(βY¯ ), rˆ1,t = β(r1,t− r¯1),
rˆ2,t = β(r2,t − r¯2) and rˆx,t = rˆ1,t − rˆ2,t.
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Notice that it is necessary to derive a solution for the gross portfolio position in the
non-stochastic steady state, α˜. For the above model, the solution method described by
Devereux and Sutherland (2011) yields the following result13
α˜ = − n
∗
1− β (15)
This implies that the home country holds a negative external position in home equity and
a positive external position in foreign equity. The intuition for this is obvious - optimal
risk sharing is achieved by holding a diversified portfolio of claims on home income and
foreign income. This is achieved by holding a negative external position in home equity
and a corresponding positive external position in foreign equity. Foreign households hold
the mirror-image portfolio.
Note that, in principle, the portfolio in period 0 may depend on the timing of asset
trade, i.e. α˜ in period 0may diﬀer from α˜ in all subsequent periods. However, in this model
the steady state portfolio is given by (15) in all periods (including period 0) regardless of
the timing of asset trade.
We are interested in the evaluation of welfare at the time policy is determined in period
0, so the focus of the analysis is on the expectation of Cˆ at the time of the policy decision,
i.e. E0[Cˆt], where E0 denotes expectation conditional on information at the time of the
policy decision. It is useful to decompose Cˆt as follows
Cˆt = nCˆt + n∗Cˆ∗t + n
∗CˆDt
where CˆDt = Cˆt − Cˆ∗t . By definition total world real income equals total world real
consumption, so it follows that (to a second order approximation)
nCˆt + n∗Cˆ∗t = nYˆt + n
∗Yˆ ∗t + λY,t +O
¡
ε3
¢
(16)
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where λY,t is a second-order term defined in the Appendix, so
E0[Cˆt] = E0[nYˆt + n∗Yˆ ∗t + λY,t + n
∗CˆDt ] +O
¡
ε3
¢
(17)
This provides part of the relationship between home-country consumption and home-
country income. The next step is to derive an expression for E0[CˆDt ].
This is relatively straightforward because the consumption Euler equation (9), and its
foreign counterpart, imply that E0[CˆDt ] is equal to a constant for period 1 onwards i.e.
E0[CˆDt ] = E0[Cˆ
D
1 ] for all t > 1 (18)
so it is only necessary to derive an expression forE0[CˆD1 ].Using the home budget constraint
(14), its foreign counterpart, the usual transversality condition, equation (18) and Wˆ0 = 0,
the following is derived
E0[CˆD1 ] = (1− β)E0
∙
Yˆ1 − Yˆ ∗1 +
1
n∗
α˜rˆx,1 + λA,1
¸
+(1− β)
∞X
t=2
βt−1E0
∙
Yˆt − Yˆ ∗t +
1
n∗
α˜rˆx,t + λA,t
¸
+O
¡
ε3
¢
(19)
where λA,t is a second-order term which is defined in the Appendix. This expression
shows that E0[CˆD1 ] is equal to the sum of the discounted value of expected future income
diﬀerences, Yˆt − Yˆ ∗t , and portfolio returns, α˜rˆx,t, (and the second-order term, λA,t). For
convenience, this expression separates out the impact of income and portfolio returns in
period 1 from the impact of the same variables in future periods. The portfolio return in
period 1, α˜rˆx,1, depends on the timing of asset trade in period 0, whereas the portfolio
return from period 2 onwards, α˜rˆx,t for t > 1, does not depend on the timing of asset
trade. It is therefore useful to treat these two terms separately.
The combination of equations (17) and (19) can now be used to analyse the impact of
asset market timing on the determination of home-country consumption.
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4 The timing of asset trade, portfolio returns and
consumption
This section describes in detail the determination of portfolio returns. First, the expected
portfolio return for period 2 onwards is derived. We then analyse portfolio returns in
period 1. Because period 1 portfolio returns depend on the timing of asset trade, we
consider separately the asset-trade-after-policy and asset-trade-before-policy cases.
4.1 Portfolio returns for period 2 onwards
In each period from period 2 onwards, optimal portfolio allocation and asset market
clearing imply that the expected excess return is given by
Et[rˆx,t+1] =
ρ
2
Et
h
(Cˆt+1 + Cˆ∗t+1)rˆx,t+1
i
+O
¡
ε3
¢
(20)
This is the risk premium on home equity.14 This expression shows that the risk premium,
up to a second order approximation, depends on one-period ahead conditional second
moments, which are constant by assumption, so Et[rˆx,t+1] is a constant for t > 1. It is
useful to define R ≡ ρ
2
Et[(Cˆt+1 + Cˆ∗t+1)rˆx,t+1]. The law of iterated expectations implies
E0[rˆx,t+1] = Et[rˆx,t+1] = R+O (ε3) for all t > 1.
4.2 Asset trade after policy
The expected excess return in period 1 depends on whether asset trade in period 0 takes
place before or after policy is determined. If asset trade takes place after policy is deter-
mined, asset prices in period 0 are determined with full knowledge of the true value of δ.
So the expected excess return between period 0 and period 1 is simply given by equation
(20), i.e. E0[rˆx,1] = R + O (ε3) where E0 and, thus R, is based on full knowledge of the
true value of δ.
Substituting using E0[rˆx,t+1] = R+O (ε3) for t ≥ 1 in (19) yields (after much simpli-
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fication) the following
E0[CˆD1 ] = V +O
¡
ε3
¢
(21)
where
V = (1− β)
∞X
t=1
βt−1
³
E0[Yˆt − Yˆ ∗t ] + λV,t
´
(22)
The Appendix provides a more detailed derivation of these expressions and defines the
second-order term λV,t.
Equations (21) and (22) show how policy aﬀects E0[CˆD1 ] in the asset-trade-after-policy
case. The value of δ can aﬀect V via its impact on the expected level of home income
(relative to foreign income), (Yˆt− Yˆ ∗t ), or its impact on the second moments of home and
foreign income via λV,t. Thus a policy which raises home country income relative to foreign
country income will tend to raise home consumption relative to foreign consumption. This
eﬀect can be thought of as capturing the on-going “flow income eﬀect” of policy on the
sustainable level of home consumption.
To see the impact on home welfare it is necessary to consider the impact on the
discounted present value of home consumption. Equation (17) can be used to derive the
following
∞X
t=1
βt−1E0[Cˆt] =
∞X
t=1
βt−1E0[Yˆt + λC,t] +O
¡
ε3
¢
(23)
where λC,t is a second-order term which is defined in the Appendix. Equation (23) shows
the link between home income and home consumption in the asset-trade-after-policy case.
An important feature of this relationship is that any change in the discounted value of
home income has a one-for-one impact on the discounted value of home consumption.
Thus, in the asset-trade-after-policy case, any policy change which reduces the discounted
value of home income will reduce the discounted value of home consumption by an equiv-
alent amount. It is now necessary to derive a relationship corresponding to equation (23)
for the asset-trade-before-policy case.
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4.3 Asset trade before policy
It will now be shown that, if asset trade takes place before policy is determined, there
is a potential capital gain or loss caused by the policy announcement which must be
added to expected asset returns in period 1. This capital gain or loss is only non-zero
in out-of-equilibrium situations where the announced value of δ diﬀers from the value of
δ expected at the time of asset trade. However, it will become apparent below that this
potential capital gain or loss changes the first derivative of welfare with respect to the
policy parameter δ and thus aﬀects the incentives faced by the policymaker.
The simplest way to calculate the size and eﬀect of the capital gain is to examine what
would happen to asset prices if asset markets were hypothetically to re-open just after
the policy announcement. The fact that the policy announcement has occurred by this
stage obviously implies that asset prices will adjust to incorporate the new information
on the policy parameter, δ. The total expected excess return between the time of initial
asset trade (i.e. before the policy announcement) and the start of period 1 can thus be
decomposed into two parts. The first part is given by the capital gain (call this CG)
caused by the change in asset prices between the time of initial asset trade and the time
of the policy announcement. The second part is the expected excess return between the
time of the policy announcement and the start of period 1.15
To derive the capital gain, CG, define Zˆ∗T0 and ZˆT0 to be equity prices at the initial
time of asset trade in period 0 and Zˆ0 and Zˆ∗0 to be equity prices in period 0 immediately
after the announcement of policy. The excess capital gain (i.e. the diﬀerence between the
capital gain on the two assets) is thus CG = (Zˆ0 − ZˆT0 )− (Zˆ∗0 − Zˆ∗T0 ). This captures the
component of the excess return caused by the policy announcement.
Now consider the expected excess return between the time of the policy announcement
and the start of period 1. At this time, because the value of the policy parameter is
known, it must be the case that expected excess returns are determined in exactly the
same way as in the asset-trade-after-policy case. In other words the expected excess return
between the time of the policy announcement at the start of period 1 will be R, where
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R = ρ
2
E0[(Cˆ1 + Cˆ∗1)rˆx,1] and E0 is based on full knowledge of the true value of δ.
The total expected excess return at the time of the policy announcement on assets
held between the time of initial asset trade (i.e. before the policy announcement) and the
start of period 1 is given by
E0[rˆx,1] = CG+R+O
¡
ε3
¢
(24)
This expression captures the eﬀect of the policy announcement on expected portfolio
returns at the time the policymaker makes an announcement about δ. This is relevant for
policymaker’s assessment of the welfare eﬀect of policy at the time the policy decision is
made.
The link between the capital gain eﬀect, CG, and consumption possibilities can be
seen by substituting (24) and E0[rˆx,t+1] = R +O (ε3) for t ≥ 1 into (19) and simplifying
to yield
E0[CˆD1 ] =
1
n∗
(1− β)α˜CG+ V +O
¡
ε3
¢
(25)
This can be contrasted with (21), which is the corresponding equation in the asset-trade-
after-policy case. The comparison between these two equations shows clearly the diﬀerent
ways policy will aﬀect E0[CˆD1 ] in the two cases. Equation (21) shows that, in the asset-
trade-after-policy case, policy will only aﬀect E0[CˆD1 ] via the impact of policy on V (where
V is defined in (22)). Equation (25) shows that these eﬀects will also arise in the asset-
trade-before-policy case, but in this case policy will have an additional eﬀect on E0[CˆD1 ]
via the impact of policy on the capital gain term, CG.
Note again that the capital gain term is only non-zero for out-of-equilibrium choices
of δ. In equilibrium CG is by definition zero. But at the time policy is determined, the
incentives faced by the policymaker in the choice of δ are influenced by the capital gain
or loss that would occur if the policymaker were to choose a non-equilibrium value of δ.
The Appendix shows how an expression for CG can be derived. This expression can
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be substituted into (25) and, after further algebra, it can be shown that
E0[CˆD1 ] = V
T +O
¡
ε3
¢
(26)
where
V T = (1− β)
∞X
t=1
βt−1
³
ET0 [Yˆt − Yˆ ∗t ] + λTV,t
´
(27)
where ET0 is the expectations operator based on households’ prior belief about the value
of δ. The second-order term λTV,t is defined in the Appendix.
Note that V T in (27) is entirely determined by prior beliefs about δ. This term is
therefore (at the time policy is chosen) exogenous and independent from the true value
of δ. Equation (26) therefore shows that policy (in terms of the true value of δ) cannot
aﬀect E0[CˆD1 ] in the case where asset trade takes place before policy is determined. The
underlying explanation for this result is revealed by comparing equations (25) and (26).
These equations demonstrate that the impact of any unanticipated change in δ on V is
precisely oﬀset by the impact of the change in δ on CG such that E0[CˆD1 ] is unaﬀected
by δ. In other words any deviation of δ from its expected value generates a one-oﬀ capital
gain which exactly oﬀsets the flow income eﬀect of the policy deviation which operates
through the future impact of policy on home income.16
The key implication of equation (27) is that the first derivative of E0[CˆD1 ] with respect
to δ is zero. The presence of the capital gain term in the asset-trade-before-policy case
thus has a key role in determining the incentives faced by the monetary authority in the
choice of δ.
Equation (26) can now be used to derive the following expression for the discounted
value of home consumption
∞X
t=1
βt−1E0[Cˆt] =
∞X
t=1
βt−1E0[nYˆt + n∗Yˆ ∗t + λY,t] +
n∗
1− βV
T +O
¡
ε3
¢
(28)
Notice that the expectational terms in V T are formed before policy is determined, while
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the expectational terms in other parts of (28) are formed after policy is determined. This
expression can be used to show the impact of policy on home welfare. In particular, it can
be compared to (23), which is the corresponding equation in the asset-trade-after-policy
case. The important feature to note from (28) is that, because 0 < n < 1, home income
has a less than one-for-one impact on home consumption. Thus, unlike in the asset-trade-
after-policy case, a policy change which reduces the discounted value of home income has
a less than one-for-one impact on the discounted value of home consumption.
The next section examines the welfare implications of the above results. Before pro-
ceeding, however, it is useful to summarise how the timing of asset trade aﬀects the link
between policy and consumption. Equation (25) shows that the choice of policy parame-
ter potentially has two distinct eﬀects that impact on expected consumption. The first is
a flow eﬀect, which operates directly via the term, V , in (25). The second is a valuation
eﬀect which arises via the capital gain term, CG, in (25). If asset trade in period 0 takes
place after policy is decided, the capital gain term is not present (see equation (21)). In
this case the choice of δ aﬀects consumption only via the V term. On the other hand,
when asset trade takes place before policy is decided, equation (26) shows that, at the
time policy is determined, the choice of δ has no eﬀect on E0[CˆD1 ]. This is because policy
has an indirect eﬀect on consumption via the capital gain term, CG. The capital gain
eﬀect exactly oﬀsets the flow income eﬀect. CG is, in eﬀect, the payoﬀ to a portfolio
which precisely hedges against policy changes. Note again that in equilibrium the capital
gain term is zero, but it nevertheless has an important impact on the first derivative of
E0[CˆD1 ] with respect to δ and it thus aﬀects the incentives facing the policymaker in the
asset-trade-before-policy case.
5 Welfare and equilibrium policy
The implications for the welfare eﬀects of policy can now be assessed by comparing equa-
tions (23) and (28). These two equations show the relationship between the discounted
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value of home income and the discounted value of home consumption. As already stressed,
the main diﬀerence between these two equations is in the size of the coeﬃcient on the
first moment of home income. Equation (23) shows that this coeﬃcient is unity in the
asset-trade-after-policy case. This contrasts with equation (28) where the coeﬃcient is
n, which is less than unity. In other words, a monetary policy rule which depresses the
expected level of home income will have a one-for-one negative impact on home consump-
tion in the asset-trade-after-policy case, but will have a less than one-for-one impact on
consumption in the asset-trade-before-policy case.
The diﬀering impact of policy on consumption in the two cases obviously has impli-
cations for the incentives facing the policymaker. In particular it has implications for
the trade-oﬀ between output (i.e. work eﬀort) and consumption. If the output of home
goods (y) and home income (Y ) are positively related (as will be the case when θ > 1)
then the policymaker faces a less favourable trade-oﬀ between output and consumption in
the asset-trade-after-policy case than in the asset-trade-before-policy case. In the asset-
trade-after-policy case any policy which leads to a reduction in the expected level of home
output and income will be penalised by a one-for-one reduction in home consumption.
This tends to discourage the choice of a policy rule which depresses the expected level
of home output. In the asset-trade-before-policy case the impact on consumption is less
than one-for-one so that the policymaker faces an incentive to move the policy parameter
in a direction which reduces the expected level of home output and income. In eﬀect, part
of the consumption impact of the policy choice is shifted on to foreign consumers.
5.1 Numerical example
The results derived above are now illustrated using a calibrated version of the model. For
the purposes of this exercise the following parameter values are used:
β = 0.99, γ = 0.75, θ = 4, φ = 8, ρ = 1, μ = 2, ζ = 0.95, σA = 0.01
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We report results for two values of n: a large country case where n = 0.5; and a small
country case where n = 0.01. The large country results are shown in Figure 4 and
the small country results are shown in Figure 5. In the figures, welfare (in steady-state
consumption units), consumption and output are measured in terms of the percentage
deviation from a baseline stochastic solution where δ = 0.17
INSERT FIGURE 4 ABOUT HERE
As discussed above, the main implications of the timing of asset trade operate via
the impact of the policy parameter on the discounted value of expected home output
and expected home consumption. Figure 4 plots these quantities, together with home
welfare, for a range of values of δ. The upper panel of Figure 4 shows these plots for the
asset-trade-before policy case, while the lower panel shows the asset-trade-after-policy
case.
Figure 4 shows that the welfare maximising value of δ diﬀers between the two cases.
Optimal δ is approximately 0.016 in the asset-trade-before-policy case and 0.0053 in the
asset-trade-after-policy case. The underlying explanation for this diﬀerence is clear from
the plots of consumption and output. The upper panel shows that, as δ increases, the
discounted expected value of home output declines. This tends to raise home welfare
(because it represents a fall in work eﬀort). The discounted expected value of home
consumption also declines as δ rises, but the decline in consumption is less than the
decline in output. This reflects the cushioning eﬀect of the capital gain in the asset-
trade-before-policy case. The decline in consumption tends to reduce home welfare, but
(initially at least) this is not suﬃcient to oﬀset the welfare benefit of lower work eﬀort.
The optimal value of δ is therefore relatively high.
These eﬀects can be contrasted with the asset-trade-after-policy case shown in the
lower panel of Figure 4. There it can be seen that the expected discounted value of home
output also declines as δ is increased. But in this case the declining level of home output
is closely matched by the decline in the expected discounted value of home consumption.
The welfare benefit of lower work eﬀort is almost exactly oﬀset by the welfare cost of
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lower consumption. The optimal value of δ is therefore relatively low.
INSERT FIGURE 5 ABOUT HERE
Figure 5 shows the same set of comparisons for the small country example, where
n = 0.01. The lower panel of Figure 5 shows that the general shapes of the welfare,
output and consumption relationships are similar to the large country example. The
main diﬀerence between the small country and large country examples occurs in the
asset-trade-before-policy case. The upper panel shows that, in this case, welfare is now
convex in δ rather than concave (at least within the range of values of δ shown here).
The explanation for this is evident from equation (28) and from the plot of consumption
in the upper panel of Figure 5. Equation (28) shows that, when n is very small, home
country consumption becomes almost entirely insulated from the level of home country
income. In terms of the upper panel of Figure 5, the relationship between consumption
and δ is close to a horizontal straight line. This implies that, as δ increases, the positive
welfare eﬀect caused by the reduction of home output is not oﬀset by any reduction in
consumption. Welfare is therefore monotonically increasing in δ (within the range of δ
shown here).
5.2 Prior beliefs and equilibrium
So far the analysis of the asset-trade-before-policy case has been based on the assumption
that prior beliefs about the policy parameter, δ, are fixed and exogenous. However, the
full solution of the model requires the endogenous determination of these prior beliefs.
Deriving this solution, however, is very straightforward.
Note from equations (13) and (28) that prior beliefs about δ only enter the model
via the term V T , which (from the point of view of the policymaker at the time policy is
determined) is a constant. This constant will aﬀect the equilibrium level of consumption,
work-eﬀort and output and will thus aﬀect the equilibrium level of welfare. But, because
V T does not depend on the actual choice of δ, prior beliefs about δ have no impact
on the first-order conditions of the policymaker’s welfare maximisation problem. The
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policymaker’s welfare maximising choice of δ is therefore independent of the prior beliefs
about δ embodied in V T . This confirms the assertion, illustrated in Figure 3, that the
best response function of the monetary authority is horizontal.
INSERT FIGURE 6 ABOUT HERE
Figure 6 demonstrates some of the details of the determination of equilibrium for the
numerical example discussed above. As in Figure 3, the prior belief about δ, denoted δT ,
is measured along the horizontal axis and the actual value of δ is measured on the vertical
axis. The curves marked Ω1 to Ω5 are iso-welfare curves, i.e. loci of points on the figure
which yield the same value of home country welfare. Welfare is increasing in a leftwards
direction, so Ω5 represents higher welfare than Ω4, and so on for the other iso-welfare
curves.
The iso-welfare curves can be used to trace out the best response function. For any
given value of δT , the policymaker’s optimal choice of δ is the point of tangency between
an iso-welfare curve and a vertical line drawn at the given value of δT . These points
of tangency trace out the horizontal best response function shown in Figure 6. The
equilibrium point for this particular numerical example is marked B. This yields an
equilibrium value of δ, denoted δO, where δO = δT = 0.016.
As previously explained, in equilibrium the capital gain at the time policy is deter-
mined is zero. Note however that the position of the best response function is tied down
by the first-order condition of the monetary authority and the first-order condition takes
into account the first derivative of the capital gain term with respect to the policy para-
meter. So the presence of the capital gain term aﬀects the position of the best response
function even though the capital gain is zero in equilibrium.
Figure 6 shows clearly that, for any value of δT not equal to δO, say δX , the policymaker
can choose a value of δ on the best response function which yields higher welfare (i.e. is
located on a superior iso-welfare curve) than choosing δ = δX .
Notice that Figure 6 can also be used to locate the equilibrium value of δ in the
asset-trade-after-policy case. In the asset-trade-after-policy case it is true by definition
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that the actual and expected value of δ are always equal. This eﬀectively implies that
the policymaker is constrained to choose a point on the 450 line. The optimal point on
the 450 line is a point of tangency between an iso-welfare curve and the 450 line. This is
marked point A on the figure. This implies δ = 0.0053 for this numerical example, which
corresponds to the optimal δ identified in the lower panel of Figure 4.
Figure 6 shows clearly that welfare at the equilibrium of the asset-trade-before-policy
case (point B) will be lower than welfare at the asset-trade-after-policy case (point A).
This follows because point A is on a better iso-welfare function than point B. It is of
course true that, if prior beliefs implied δT = 0.0053, the policymaker in the asset-trade-
before-policy case could achieve higher welfare at point C on the best response function.
But this point is not attainable in equilibrium because agents in asset markets would not
rationally expect δ = 0.0053. The only rational expectations equilibrium in the asset-
trade-before-policy case is point B.
The small-country case illustrated in Figure 5 shows a case where equilibrium in the
asset-trade-before-policy case is apparently not well-defined. In this case the welfare
function is convex and there is no finite welfare maximising value of δ.
Before concluding, it is useful briefly to consider the case where asset trade in period
0 occurs at exactly the same time as monetary policy is determined. Given the analysis
described above, equilibrium in this case is very easy to derive. It is in fact identical to the
equilibrium of the asset-trade-before-policy case. To see this note that, as stated above,
the policymaker’s optimal choice of δ for any value of δT is a constant, δO. If agents in
asset markets understand the policymaker’s welfare maximisation problem then their best
prediction of δ is δO regardless of whether asset trade takes place before or is simultaneous
to the policy decision. Hence asset markets will set δT = δO and the policymaker will set
δ = δO, exactly as in the asset-trade-before-policy case.
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6 Conclusion
Using a standard dynamic general equilibrium model of an open economy, this paper has
shown how the timing of asset trade relative to policy decisions can aﬀect the welfare
evaluation of policy. It is shown that, if asset trade in the initial period takes place before
the announcement of the monetary policy rule, home consumers are eﬀectively insured
against the choice of policy rule. This allows the home country policymaker to choose
a policy rule which reduces home country work eﬀort in the knowledge that the impact
on home country consumption is cushioned by portfolio returns at the time of the policy
announcement. If, on the other hand, asset trade in the initial period takes place after the
announcement of the policy rule, this insurance is not present and home consumers have
to bear the full consumption consequences of a reduction in home output. The welfare
incentives faced by the policymaker are significantly diﬀerent between the two cases. In
the asset-trade-before-policy case a welfare maximising policymaker has an incentive to
choose a policy rule which depresses the expected level of home output. This incentive
does not arise in the asset-trade-after-policy case. Numerical examples confirm that this
can have a significant impact on the welfare maximising policy rule (particularly in the
small economy example).
The current literature on monetary policy in open economies tends (implicitly) to
focus on the asset-trade-before-policy case. The analysis reported above shows that this
is not an innocuous assumption and demonstrates in detail how and why the timing of
asset market trade matters. In itself, however, the analysis provides no definitive guidance
on which assumption about asset market timing is most appropriate. From an empirical
perspective, it is arguable that policy decisions are always made against a background
where agents hold diversified portfolios. Policy announcements frequently give rise to
asset price movements and therefore capital gains and losses. The asset-trade-before-
policy case therefore has some claims to empirical relevance.
In Senay and Sutherland (2007), in the context of a static single-period model, we
speculated that the asset-trade-after-policy case has more claim to empirical relevance
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because it appears to capture the fact that asset trade must, by definition, occur after
policy announcements in a multi-period world. The current paper explicitly shows that,
even when there is period-by-period asset trade, the crucial issue is the timing of asset
trade in the period in which a policy announcement is made. The empirical relevance
of the two approaches is therefore more finely balanced than suggested in Senay and
Sutherland (2007).
Regardless of empirical considerations, from a theoretical perspective it seems unsat-
isfactory to judge the welfare eﬀects of policy in a framework where the population of the
country in question is implicitly insured against the potential adverse eﬀects of policy.
This paper shows that, when analysing the welfare eﬀects of policy in open economies,
it is important to acknowledge and understand the welfare incentives created by interna-
tional financial markets. This is an issue which has, hitherto, received little attention in
the related literature.
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Appendix
Second-order terms
The second-order term λB,t which appears in equation (14) is defined as follows
λB,t =
1
2
Yˆ 2t −
1
2
Cˆ2t + αˆt−1rˆx,t +
1
β
Wˆt−1rˆ2,t (29)
where αˆt−1 = (αt−1 − α¯)/(βY¯ ). Note that this expression contains a term in the first-
order deviation of gross portfolios from the non-stochastic steady state, αˆt−1. Devereux
and Sutherland (2010) explain how to derive a solution for αˆt−1. This term, however,
drops out of the analysis once the conditional expectations operator is applied, so an
explicit solution is not required for the results reported above.
The second-order term λY,t in equation (16) is defined as follows
λY,t =
1
2
nn∗
³
Yˆt − Yˆ ∗t
´2
The derivation of this expression (and a number of other expressions used above) is
considerably simplified by noting that, at the level of a first-order approximation, equity
trade ensures that Cˆt = Cˆ∗t + O (ε2) for all t and in all states of the world, regardless of
the timing of asset trade in period 0.
The second-order term λA,t in equation (19) is defined as follows
λA,t =
1
2
(Yˆ 2t − Yˆ ∗2t ) +
1
n∗
αˆt−1rˆx,t +
1
βn∗
Wˆt−1rˆ2,t
The second-order term λC,t in equation (23) is defined as follows
λC,t =
1
2
n∗2
³
Yˆt − Yˆ ∗t
´2
+ n∗(1− ρ)
³
Yˆt − Yˆ ∗t
´³
nYˆt + n∗Yˆ ∗t
´
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Asset holdings and the budget constraint
In the text, we focus on a case where assets are defined to be in zero net supply. Here
we show that a more conventional model with trade in equities which are in positive
net supply may easily be transformed into the algebra of zero net supply used in the
text. To see this in the context of the example model, assume that, instead of receiving
income from production, all income comes in the form of returns on holdings of home
and foreign equity. Let ω1,t and ω∗1,t represent the home and foreign share of home equity,
and normalize so that the total supply of home equity is unity. Likewise, let ω2,t and
ω∗2,t represent the home and foreign holdings of foreign equity, with total supply again
normalized to unity. Then in an economy where there is asset trade only in the two
equities, the home country faces a budget constraint given by:
Ztω1,t + Z∗t ω2,t = (Zt + Yt)ω1,t−1 + (Z
∗
t + Y
∗
t )ω2,t−1 − Ct (30)
where, as before, Zt and Z∗t are equity prices. The equity market clearing conditions are
now
ω1,t + ω∗1,t = 1, ω2,t + ω
∗
2,t = 1
It is easy to show that (30) may be transformed into the budget constraint used in
the text, where assets are defined to be in zero net supply. To see this, re-write (30) in
the form
Zt(ω1,t − 1) + Z∗t ω2,t =
Zt + Yt
Zt−1
Zt−1(ω1,t−1 − 1) +
Z∗t + Y ∗t
Z∗t−1
Z∗t−1ω2,t−1 + Yt − Ct (31)
Now redefining α1,t = Zt(ω1,t−1 − 1) as external holdings of the home asset and α2,t =
Z∗t ω2,t as external holdings of the foreign asset, we arrive at
α1,t + α2,t =
Zt + Yt
Zt−1
α1,t−1 +
Z∗t + Y ∗t
Z∗t−1
α2,t−1 + Yt − Ct (32)
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which, given the definitions of r1,t and r2,t, is identical to (6). Thus, the model where
assets are in positive net supply is transformed into a model where the defined assets are
in zero net supply.
Derivation of equation (22)
Substituting E0[rˆx,t+1] = R+O (ε3) into (19) yields
E0[CˆD1 ] = (1− β)
µ
E0[Yˆ1 − Yˆ ∗1 ] +
1
n∗
α˜R+E0[λA,1]
¶
+(1− β)
∞X
t=2
βt−1
µ
E0[Yˆt − Yˆ ∗t ] +
1
n∗
α˜R+E0[λA,t]
¶
+O
¡
ε3
¢
which can be simplified to yield
E0[CˆD1 ] = (1− β)
∞X
t=1
βt−1
µ
E0[Yˆt − Yˆ ∗t ] +
1
n∗
α˜R+E0[λA,t]
¶
+O
¡
ε3
¢
Note that R and λA contain only second-order terms and can thus be evaluated using
first-order accurate expressions for Cˆ, Cˆ∗, rˆ1, rˆ2 and Wˆ . Furthermore, it is possible to
obtain expressions for Cˆ, Cˆ∗, rˆ1, rˆ2 and Wˆ in terms of Yˆ and Yˆ ∗ and thus express R and
λA in terms of the second moments of Yˆ and Yˆ ∗. After much further algebra it is possible
to show that
P∞
t=1 β
t−1 ¡ 1
n∗ α˜R+E0[λA,t]
¢
=P∞
t=1 β
t−1 1
2
E0
h
(1− 2nρ)Yˆ 2t − (1− 2n∗ρ)Yˆ ∗2t − 2(n∗ − n)ρYˆtYˆ ∗t
i
+O (ε3)
so
E0[CˆD1 ] = (1− β)
∞X
t=1
βt−1
³
E0[Yˆt − Yˆ ∗t ] + λV,t
´
+O
¡
ε3
¢
where
λV,t =
1
2
E0
h
(1− 2nρ)Yˆ 2t − (1− 2n∗ρ)Yˆ ∗2t − 2(n∗ − n)ρYˆtYˆ ∗t
i
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Equity prices
The returns on home and foreign equities are given by r1,t = Xt/Zt−1 and r2,t = X∗t /Z∗t−1,
where, for convenience, equity payoﬀs are defined as Xt = Yt + Zt and X∗t = Y ∗t + Z∗t .
Second-order approximation of these relationships imply
rˆ1,t = Xˆt − Zˆt−1 + 12 rˆ21,t +O (ε3)
rˆ2,t = Xˆ∗t − Zˆ∗t−1 + 12 rˆ22,t +O (ε3)
(33)
and
Xˆt = (1− β)Yˆt + βZˆt + λX,t +O (ε3)
Xˆ∗t = (1− β)Yˆ ∗t + βZˆ∗t + λX∗,t +O (ε3)
(34)
where
λX,t = 12(1− β)Yˆ 2t +
1
2
βZˆ2t − 12Xˆ2t
λX∗,t = 12(1− β)Yˆ ∗2t +
1
2
βZˆ∗2t − 12Xˆ∗2t
(35)
Using (33), (34) and the fact that R = Et[rˆ1,t+1 − rˆ2,t+1], it follows that
Zˆt − Zˆ∗t = βEt(Zˆt+1 − Zˆ∗t+1)
+Et
∙
(1− β)(Yˆt+1 − Yˆ ∗t+1) +
1
2
(rˆ21,t+1 − rˆ22,t+1) + (λX,t+1 − λX∗,t+1)
¸
−R+O
¡
ε3
¢
and thus the diﬀerence between home and foreign equity prices can be written as follows
Zˆt − Zˆ∗t =
∞X
i=1
βi−1
n
Et
h
(1− β)(Yˆt+i − Yˆ ∗t+i) + λE,t+i
i
−R
o
+O
¡
ε3
¢
(36)
where
λE,t =
1
2
(rˆ21,t − rˆ22,t) + λX,t − λX∗,t
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After some rearrangement λE,t can be written as follows
λE,t =
1
2
(1− β)(Yˆ 2t − Yˆ ∗2t ) +
1
2
β(Zˆ2t − Zˆ∗2t )
−1
2
(Zˆ2t−1 − Zˆ∗2t−1)− (rˆ1,tZˆt−1 − rˆ2,tZˆ∗t−1)
The capital gain term, CG = (Zˆ0 − Zˆ∗0)− (ZˆT0 − Zˆ∗T0 ), is thus
CG =
∞X
t=1
βt−1{(1− β)(E0[Yˆt − Yˆ ∗t ]−ET0 [Yˆt − Yˆ ∗t ])
+(E0[λE,t]−ET0 [λE,t])− (R−RT )}+O
¡
ε3
¢
(37)
Derivation of equation (27)
Equation (37) can be substituted into (25) and simplified (using α˜ = −n∗/(1 − β)) to
yield
E0[CˆD1 ] = (1− β)
∞X
t=1
βt−1
½
ET0 [Yˆt − Yˆ ∗t ] +
1
n∗
α˜(E0[λE,t]−ET0 [λE,t]) +
1
n∗
α˜RT
¾
+(1− β)
∞X
t=1
βt−1E0[λA,t] +O
¡
ε3
¢
Note that λE and λA contain only second-order terms and can thus be evaluated using
first-order accurate expressions for Cˆ, Cˆ∗, rˆ1, rˆ2 and Wˆ . As above, it is possible to obtain
expressions for Cˆ, Cˆ∗, rˆ1, rˆ2 and Wˆ in terms of Yˆ and Yˆ ∗ and thus express λE and λA in
terms of the second moments of Yˆ and Yˆ ∗. After further algebra it can be shown that
∞X
t=1
βt−1E0[
1
n∗
α˜λE,t + λA,t] = 0 +O
¡
ε3
¢
so
E0[CˆD1 ] = (1− β)
∞X
t=1
βt−1
³
ET0 [Yˆt − Yˆ ∗t ] + λTV,t
´
+O
¡
ε3
¢
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where
λTV,t =
1
2
ET0
h
(1− 2nρ)Yˆ 2t − (1− 2n∗ρ)Yˆ ∗2t − 2(n∗ − n)ρYˆtYˆ ∗t
i
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Notes
1. See, for instance, Gali and Monacelli (2005), Devereux and Engel (2003), Benigno
and Benigno (2006), Pappa (2004), Faia and Monacelli (2008) and De Paoli (2009a
2009b). Some significant contributions to the open economy literature, however, are
not based on trade in Arrow-Debreu assets. For instance, Clarida, Gali and Gertler
(2002) and Corsetti and Pesenti (2005) assume a unit elasticity of international
trade. This implies that financial market structure is irrelevant. Obstfeld and Rogoﬀ
(1995) and Kollmann (2002) assume that international financial trade is confined to
non-contingent bonds.
2. Note that asset market timing is only relevant for welfare evaluation from the point of
view of national policymakers. When the global welfare eﬀects of policy are analysed
from the point of view of a global policymaker, the spillover generated by asset trade
is fully internalised by the policymaker regardless of the timing of asset trade. The
timing of asset trade therefore has no impact on the incentives faced by a global
policymaker.
3. In a rational expectations equilibrium the actual realised capital gain is always zero.
However, it is the impact on the policymaker’s incentives that is created by the
potential capital gain which is important for generating the diﬀerence between the
asset-trade-before-policy case and the asset-trade-after-policy case.
4. In an analysis of optimal capital taxation in a small open economy Schmitt-Grohe
and Uribe (2003) also discuss an issue related to the timing of asset trade. Rather
than focusing on the timing of asset trade per se, they frame the problem in terms of
the presence or absence of Arrow-Debreu securities which are specifically contingent
on the decisions of the policymaker. Wagner (2007) has analysed the role of
international risk sharing in distorting the incentives faced by national policymakers.
However, Wagner does not analyse the implications of the timing of asset trade.
Devereux and Engel (2003) do explicitly consider asset market timing in relation to
optimal monetary policy in an open economy. But asset markets have a very limited
39
role in their model because they impose a unit elasticity of substitution between
goods produced in diﬀerent countries. Devereux and Engel therefore find that asset
market timing has no implications for any of their results.
5. We assume that policy is represented by a credible once-and-for-all decision about a
policy rule. An alternative approach would be to assume that policy is re-optimised
period by period. This creates a dynamic game between the policymaker and traders
in asset markets. The equilibrium of this dynamic game will depend on the timing of
asset trade relative to the policy decision with-in each period. We focus on the case
where policy is a once-and-for-all decision because this corresponds more closely to
the standard assumption in the existing literature on monetary policy in open
economies. The alternative assumption (where policy is re-optimised period by
period) is likely to be an interesting topic for further research.
6. In the model used below, equity trade is suﬃcient to support full risk sharing (for a
given setting of monetary policy). Our asset-trade-before-policy case corresponds
precisely to the Arrow-Debreu case which is the standard assumption in the
literature. But the same issues (about the timing of asset trade) also arise when
there are not suﬃcient assets to support full risk sharing. In cases such as this there
is not full insurance, but the timing of asset trade aﬀects the degree to which there is
insurance against policy changes, and this insurance will work through a capital gain
valuation eﬀect in the initial period. See Devereux and Sutherland (2008) for an
example of how the setting of monetary policy can aﬀect portfolio allocation in a
model where markets are incomplete. Devereux and Sutherland (2008) do not
explicitly analyse the welfare eﬀects of policy, nor do they consider issues related to
the timing of asset trade.
7. We adopt the notational convention that α1 and α2 represent external holdings of
equities. That is, α1 is the value of claims on home output sold by home households
to foreign households, and α2 is the value of claims on foreign output sold by foreign
households to home households. An alternative notational convention is to measure
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portfolio positions in terms of the total (internal plus external) holdings of assets.
Our choice of notational convention involves no loss of generality and proves to be
particularly convenient for deriving our results. See the Appendix for an explanation
of the link between the two notational conventions.
8. For the purposes of this paper, a rule of the form given in (11) is nevertheless a
reasonable choice as a benchmark example because it is known that optimal policy
approximately takes this form in the context of a closed economy model analogous to
the model outlined above (see for instance Woodford, 2003).
9. Note that in the asset-trade-after-policy case it is important that households do not
hold any gross portfolio positions at the time of the policy announcement. "Asset
prices" implicitly respond to the policy announcement, but, in the absence of any
initial gross positions, this has no impact on NFA.
10. The interpretation of the interaction between the asset market and the policymaker
as a game is however not fully satisfactory because the asset market is not a single
agent that acts strategically, but is rather a mechanism where asset prices are
determined via trade amongst a large number of atomistic agents who have rational
expectations of future policy actions. In the analysis below we therefore do not
formally pursue the game-theoretic interpretation of equilibrium.
11. Note that Ωˆ ≡ (1− β)(Ω− Ω¯)C¯ρ−1. By writing welfare in this form, Ωˆ can be
interpreted in terms of “steady-state consumption units”.
12. The policy parameter δ aﬀects the equilibrium variance of output and thus the
variance of the realised return on home equities. In equilibrium this aﬀects the risk
premium on home equities. Likewise, the variance of output aﬀects optimal labour
supply because households are risk averse (i.e. a higher variance of output reduces
equilibrium work eﬀort).
13. Strictly speaking, it is not necessary to use the Devereux and Sutherland method to
derive a solution for α˜. The financial structure in the above model implies that full
consumption risk sharing (against shocks to A) is possible. Equilibrium gross
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portfolio positions can therefore simply be backed-out from a solution of the model
where income pooling is imposed. This approach yields the same result as the
Devereux and Sutherland method.
14. See Devereux and Sutherland (2008) for a more detailed derivation of this
expression.
15. Note that we maintain the assumption that asset trade only actually takes place at
the start of period 1. We are using the hypothetical re-opening of asset markets at
the time of the policy announcement purely as a device for calculating the impact of
the policy announcement on asset prices.
16. As noted in the introduction, in the existing literature it is typically stated that
complete international risk sharing implies a relationship of the form
UC∗/UC = k(SP ∗/P ), where UC and UC∗ are home and foreign marginal utilities of
consumption and k is an exogenous constant. In the context of the model of this
paper, UC = C−ρ, UC∗ = C∗−ρ and SP ∗/P = 1, so equation (26), which shows that
E0[CˆD1 ] is exogenous and constant in the asset-trade-before-policy case, is consistent
with the assumption that k is exogenous and constant. On the other hand, in the
asset-trade-after-policy case, equation (25) shows that E0[CˆD1 ] depends on the
policymaker’s choice of policy parameter. The asset-trade-after-policy case therefore
implies that k is endogenous and depends on policy choices.
17. In the asset-trade-before-policy case, the model is solved while imposing equation
(26). The solution in the asset-trade-after-policy case requires that equation (21) is
imposed.
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Figure 1: Time line - asset trade before policy 
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trade in period 0 asset prices fully 
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Figure 3: Equilibrium when asset trade takes before policy. 
?O
?O
0 0.005 0.01 0.015 0.02 0.025
−20
−15
−10
−5
0
5
x 10
−3 Asset Trade Before Policy
Policy parameter, δ
0 0.005 0.01 0.015 0.02 0.025
−20
−15
−10
−5
0
5
x 10
−3 Asset Trade After Policy
Policy parameter, δ
Welfare Consumption Output
Figure 4: Large Country Example
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Figure 5: Small Country Example
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